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Discounts during Thanksgiving and Christmas are common in a variety of retail
markets. Although classical economic theory predicts that prices should increase when
aggregate demand is high, one possibility is that consumers are more price elastic
during seasonal demand peaks. In this article, we examine holiday pricing in the airline
industry. Exploiting a unique panel of almost 22 million fares, we find that fares
purchased on a holiday for flights in the sixty-day period following the holiday are
1.8% cheaper, supporting the conjecture that airlines price discriminate when the mix
of purchasing passengers makes demand more elastic. An increase in competition is
associated with larger holiday purchase discounts, with the largest discounts reserved
for flights within one-week of departure.
JEL classification: L11, L13, L93, D40.
Keywords: advance-purchase discounts, airline pricing, competition, price discrim-
ination, sales.
1 Introduction
Sales during holiday periods are common in a variety of retail markets. For example, Cheva-
lier et al. (2003) and MacDonald (2000) document that grocery prices are lower during the
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Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays while Warner and Barsky (1995) find that prices for
consumer appliances are lower in the period preceding Christmas.1 Moreover, Levy et al.
(2010) find that price decreases are more common than price increases during holiday periods.
Although classical economic theory predicts that prices should increase during periods
of high aggregate demand (such as the period surrounding Thanksgiving and Christmas),
previous studies assert that prices fall during these seasonal demand peaks because consumers
are more price elastic.2 For example, MacDonald (2000) argues that high seasonal demand
reduces the cost of informative advertising, which in turn increases buyers’ price sensitivity.
Warner and Barsky (1995) suggest that consumers are better informed in high demand states,
resulting in retailers perceiving their demand to be more elastic. Similarly, Chevalier et al.
(2003) argue that consumers may search more intensively for low prices during periods of
high demand because the expected returns from search are larger during these periods.3
In this article, we examine whether holiday discounts extend to the airline industry.
We expect demand to be more elastic on federal holidays because price inelastic business
travelers are unlikely to purchase outside of normal business hours.4 As a result, federal
holidays provide an opportunity for airlines to price discriminate by offering discounts to
passengers who purchase on these dates.
Price discrimination may result in higher profits if firms are able to agree on which types
of consumers are price elastic (Borenstein, 1985; Holmes, 1989). However, even if airlines
agree that passengers purchasing on a federal holiday are more price elastic, they may still
1For a witty review of the economics surrounding Christmas, see Birg and Goeddeke (2016).
2Other explanations have also been offered. For example, Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) suggest that
prices fall because firms are not able to sustain tacit collusion in high demand periods. In other words, the
temptation to cheat from a collusive agreement is highest during a temporary demand spike because the
gain from cheating is increasing in current demand whereas the loss from punishment is increasing in future
demand. Alternatively, Lal and Matutes (1994) and Hosken and Reiffen (2004) suggest that multiproduct
retailers may discount highly demanded products during peak periods to facilitate greater store traffic.
3This explanation is consistent with Varian (1980), who argues that sales are a form of price discrimination
in which firms effectively offer lower prices to consumers with superior information or lower search costs.
4Escobari et al. (2019) find that airfares are higher during business hours and lower in the evening. We
also expect demand to be more elastic on “shopping holidays” such as Black Friday, Christmas Eve, and New
Year’s Eve because many public and private sector employees request these days off from work.
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avoid discriminatory pricing. For example, Corts (1998) shows that price discrimination
may result in “all-out competition” where prices are lower for all consumers than under
uniform pricing. In this competitive environment, the ability to price discriminate results in
a prisoner’s dilemma in which each firm has a dominant strategy to price discriminate even
though profits would be higher for all firms if discrimination were not possible.
Furthermore, recent work by Ciliberto and Williams (2014) and Ciliberto et al. (2019)
suggests that airlines may be tacitly colluding when setting fares. If airlines are colluding,
they may coordinate to avoid certain types of discriminatory pricing. For example, if fewer
airline tickets are purchased on holidays relative to other periods, the theoretical models
in Haltiwanger and Harrington Jr (1991) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) suggest that
collusive prices may increase. Coordination is also expected to be easier in the consolidated
United States airline industry where American, Delta, Southwest, and United currently con-
trol over 80% of the domestic market.5 Therefore, although we hypothesize that federal
holidays provide an opportunity to price discriminate by discounting fares, it is also possible
that fares may increase.
To determine if airlines price discriminate on federal holidays, we exploit a unique panel
of almost 22 million fares collected over a seven-month period. Our fare data is comprehen-
sive, encompassing many densely traveled routes across the continental United States (U.S.).
Tracking the price of each flight in the sixty-day period prior to departure, we find that fares
published on a major holiday for flights in the sixty-day period following the holiday are
1.8% cheaper on average. Allowing for heterogeneity in discounts across holidays, we find
that the holiday booking discount ranges from 0.9% on Cyber Monday to 5.9% on Christmas
Eve and Christmas Day. Moreover, we find that the largest holiday discounts are offered for
flights that are within one-week of departure (flights typically purchased by business travel-
5Mergers between American and TWA in 2001, US Airways and America West in 2005, Delta and North-
west in 2008, United and Continental in 2010, Southwest and AirTran in 2011, American and US Airways in
2014, and Alaska and Virgin America in 2016 have resulted in the four largest airlines (American, United,
Delta, and Southwest) holding almost 85% of the U.S. market.
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ers), supporting the conjecture that airlines discount fares on federal holidays because price
inelastic business travelers are unlikely to purchase on these dates.
Further decomposing our results, we examine how holiday booking discounts are affected
by market structure. As discussed in Borenstein (1985), Holmes (1989), and Chandra and
Lederman (2018), the relationship between competition and price discrimination is ambiguous
in oligopolistic markets when consumers differ both in their underlying willingness-to-pay and
their degree of brand loyalty. We find that an increase in competition is associated with larger
holiday purchase discounts.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes previous literature
on price discrimination in oligopolistic markets, with a particular emphasis on empirical
studies of the airline industry. Section 3 describes the fare and itinerary data collected for
the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents a descriptive analysis of dynamic pricing in the
sixty-day period leading up to a flight’s departure. Section 5 outlines the empirical model
used to identify holiday booking discounts. Section 6 presents empirical results. Finally,
Section 7 concludes.
2 Price Discrimination and Price Dispersion in Oligopolis-
tic Markets
Firms in a variety of industries including automobiles, Broadway theater, energy, hospitality,
retail, and specialty coffee engage in price discrimination (Chevalier and Kashyap, 2019; Ivaldi
and Martimort, 1994; Leslie, 2004; Möller and Watanabe, 2010; McManus, 2007; Verboven,
1996, 2002). In the airline industry, a sizable literature has developed examining the various
ways in which airlines practice second and third-degree price discrimination.6 Dana (1998)
6Second-degree price discrimination occurs when firms offer a menu of prices that induce consumers to
differentiate themselves. Non-linear pricing strategies such as quantity discounts and charging different prices
for refundable and non-refundable tickets are examples of second-degree price discrimination. In contrast,
third-degree price discrimination occurs when firms directly segment consumers according to some observable
metric. Student discounts, senior citizen discounts, and prices that vary by location are examples of third-
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and Gale and Holmes (1993) show that advance-purchase restrictions enable airlines to reduce
fares for price-elastic leisure travelers. Other ticket restrictions such as Saturday-night stay,
length of stay, and non-refundability are designed to discourage price-inelastic passengers
from buying cheaper tickets (Escobari and Jindapon, 2014; Stavins, 2001).7 Puller and Taylor
(2012) find that fares purchased on weekends are 5% cheaper, supporting the conjecture that
airlines price discriminate when the mix of purchasing passengers makes demand more elastic.
Applying a similar argument, Escobari et al. (2019) find that fares are higher during business
hours and lower in the evening. Additionally, Luttmann (2019b) and Lewis (2020) offer
conflicting evidence on the existence of directional price discrimination in the domestic U.S.
market.8
The empirical analysis presented in this article is also motivated by the extensive the-
oretical literature on the relationship between competition and price dispersion when firms
practice third-degree price discrimination.9 In particular, Borenstein (1985), Holmes (1989),
and Chandra and Lederman (2018) show that the relationship between competition and
price discrimination in oligopolistic markets is ambiguous when consumers differ both in
their underlying willingness-to-pay and their degree of brand loyalty.
Consistent with theory, previous empirical studies of the airline industry that examine
this relationship provide conflicting results. Borenstein and Rose (1994) and Stavins (2001)
find that competition increases price dispersion while Gaggero and Piga (2011), Gerardi and
Shapiro (2009), and Siegert and Ulbricht (2020) find that competition reduces price disper-
degree price discrimination.
7Escobari and Jindapon (2014) present a theoretical model examining how airlines use refundable and
non-refundable tickets to screen consumers who are uncertain about their demand. Empirically, they show
that the difference in fare between refundable and non-refundable tickets declines as the departure date
approaches.
8Directional price discrimination occurs when airlines charge different prices on the same flights to pas-
sengers who originate from different endpoints. This form of price discrimination is feasible if demand
elasticities substantially differ between endpoint cities. Using aggregated transacted fare data from 2015,
Luttmann (2019b) finds evidence consistent with airlines practicing directional price discrimination. Using
published fare data, Lewis (2020) finds that airlines do not directionally price discriminate on domestic routes
but do directionally discriminate on international routes.
9See Stole (2007) for a comprehensive review of price discrimination under oligopoly.
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sion. Furthermore, Dai et al. (2014) find a nonmonotonic relationship, with competition
increasing dispersion in concentrated markets and reducing it in competitive markets. Ex-
amining the Canadian airline industry, Chandra and Lederman (2018) find that competition
has little impact at the top or bottom of the price distribution but a significant impact in the
middle of the distribution, with competition increasing some price differentials and decreasing
others.
3 Fare and Itinerary Data
Previous empirical studies that examine airline price dispersion and price discrimination in
the U.S. have typically relied on the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Airline Origin and
Destination Survey (DB1B).10 Data from this survey are released quarterly and represent a
10% random sample of all airline tickets sold for U.S. domestic travel. However, the DB1B
data do not include information on the specific flight(s) purchased or the exact purchase and
departure dates (only the quarter of travel is reported). As a result, the DB1B cannot be
used to examine holiday pricing or control for other factors that may affect fares, such as
advance-purchase requirements or the specific date of travel. With these shortcomings in
mind, we constructed our own dataset using published fare and itinerary information from a
major online travel agency.11
In lieu of collecting published fares for all possible routes in the U.S. market, we relied
on DB1B data from the third and fourth quarters of 2018 to identify the 98 major airport-
pairs within the continental U.S. ranked by total passenger traffic.12 These routes were
supplemented with 17 monopoly, 24 duopoly, and 16 airport-pairs without nonstop service
10These studies include Borenstein and Rose (1994), Hayes and Ross (1998), Gerardi and Shapiro (2009),
Dai et al. (2014), and Luttmann (2019b), among others.
11Major online travel agencies (OTAs) and aggregator websites include Expedia, Google Flights, Kayak,
Priceline, Skyscanner, and Travelocity. This article is not the first to analyze data from a major OTA. For
example, see Escobari (2009), Escobari et al. (2019), Luttmann (2019a), and Williams (2021), among others.
12A market in our analysis is defined as a directional pair of origin and destination airports. Therefore, Los
Angeles (LAX)-New York (JFK) and New York (JFK)-Los Angeles (LAX) are treated as separate markets.
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(these are routes where passengers must take a connecting flight to reach their destination).13
Due to overlap between the 98 major and 24 duopoly airport-pairs, our analysis covers a total
of 148 directional airport-pairs instead of 155. A detailed list of these routes is provided in
Appendix Table A1.
Figure 1 displays a map of the routes included in our analysis. As the map illustrates,
our route coverage is fairly comprehensive across the continental U.S.











































To construct our analysis sample, data were collected over a seven-month period for flights
departing between October 1st, 2019 and February 29th, 2020.14 Fare quotes were obtained
13The list of monopoly, duopoly, and connecting airport-pairs were also ranked by total passenger traffic.
14Because our analysis sample ends on February 29th, 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has a negligible
impact on our results. In the U.S., COVID-19 was declared a national emergency on March 13th, 2020.
Moreover, California became the first state to issue a statewide stay-at-home order on March 19th, 2020.
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daily, for one-way travel between the airport-pairs listed in Appendix Table A1.15 For each
route, fares for each of the next sixty travel days were collected, allowing us to track the
price of an individual flight (or sequence of flights for connecting trips) over the sixty-day
period prior to departure.16 We focus on a sixty-day window to capture leisure travelers who
purchase flights well in advance of the departure date in addition to business travelers who
purchase flights closer to the date of departure.17
Our sampling procedure resulted in a unique sample of 21,829,963 observations. 30.8%
of our observations are for connecting trips. The airlines included in our sample are Alaska,
Allegiant, American, Delta, Frontier, JetBlue, Spirit, Sun Country, and United.18
4 Descriptive Analysis of Dynamic Pricing During the
Booking Period
To illustrate how fares evolve in the sixty-day period prior to departure, Figure 2 displays
the average fare per mile by number of days to departure for each of the nine airlines in our
analysis sample.19 The top panel of Figure 2 displays averages for the four largest full-service
carriers (Alaska, American, Delta, and United) while the bottom panel displays averages for
the five low-cost carriers (Allegiant, Frontier, JetBlue, Spirit, and Sun Country). For both
full-service carriers (FSCs) and low-cost carriers (LCCs), the fare per mile remains relatively
15We focus on one-way trips due to difficulties in specifying trip duration. For any given departure date,
there are a substantial number of roundtrip fares that could potentially be gathered, each depending on
trip duration. For example, fares for three-day trips are likely different from seven and fourteen-day trips.
Similar articles using published fare and itinerary data also focus on one-way trips due to this duration issue.
Examples include Bilotkach (2005), Bilotkach et al. (2010), Escobari et al. (2019), and Luttmann (2019a).
16For example, fare quotes for a flight departing on January 1st, 2020 were collected daily between November
3rd, 2019 and December 31st, 2019. Our data collection began in August 2019 to ensure that fare quotes
were obtained over the full sixty-day period before departure for flights departing on October 1st, 2019.
17In his analysis of intertemporal price discrimination in monopoly airline markets, Lazarev (2013) employs
a six-week data collection window.
18Fare quotes for Southwest Airlines are not available on travel aggregator websites such as Expedia, Google
Flights, and Kayak.
19Only nonstop flights were used to generate Figure 2. Of the 21,829,963 observations in our sample, 69.2%
(15,106,864) are for nonstop travel.
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stable during the early part of the booking period, starts to increase three weeks before
departure, and substantially increases in the last seven days to departure.
For FSCs, there are four well-defined fare hikes that occur from twenty-one to twenty,
fourteen to thirteen, seven to six, and three to two days prior to departure. In other words,
FSCs sharply increase fares at specific three-week, two-week, one-week, and three-day mile-
stones prior to departure. The first three milestones likely reflect the expiration of discount
fare classes attached to three-week, two-week, and one-week advance-purchase requirements.
The last milestone likely reflects intertemporal price discrimination for late booking passen-
gers who have a lower price elasticity of demand (Gaggero, 2010). Furthermore, consistent
with the expectation that purchasing passengers are more price inelastic as the departure
date approaches, the magnitude of the fare jump monotonically increases as we move across
the three-week, two-week, one-week, and three-day fare hike milestones.
Consistent with their status as a LCC, Allegiant, Frontier, JetBlue, Spirit, and Sun
Country all have a lower average fare per mile than the four FSCs (see bottom panel of Figure
2). Allegiant and JetBlue fares are also consistently higher than Frontier, Spirit, and Sun
Country fares across the entire sixty-day booking period. Nevertheless, both FSCs and LCCs
display similar patterns. Fares are relatively stable until three weeks before departure when
fares begin to monotonically increase. In addition, JetBlue and Spirit sharply increase fares
at three-week, two-week, one-week, and three-day milestones prior to departure, behavior
consistent with Alaska, American, Delta, and United.
To further illustrate how fares evolve in the sixty-day period before departure, Figure 3
displays the probability of observing a fare increase (denoted by a grey bar) or fare decrease
(denoted by a white bar) for each day to departure. The number at the top of each gray bar
displays the average percentage fare increase, while the number at the bottom of each white
bar displays the average percentage fare decrease. For example, the gray bar at 31 days to
departure in the top panel of Figure 3 indicates that the fare for 11% of the flights in our
sample increased 31 days before departure and the average fare increase was 24%. Similarly,
9










































Figure 3: Probability of observing a fare increase or decrease during the booking period
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Notes: Numbers at the top (bottom) of each bar indicate the average percentage fare increase (decrease) for
each day to departure. These percentage fare increases and decreases are relative to the flight’s fare on the
previous day.
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the white bar at 31 days to departure indicates that the fare for 9% of the flights in our
sample decreased 31 days before departure and the average fare decrease was 17%.
As depicted in the top panel of Figure 3, fares are relatively stable during the early booking
period, with the probability of a fare increase hovering around 10% and the probability of a
fare decrease at 8% on average. The magnitude of fare increases and decreases are also stable
during the early booking period, ranging from 21%-24% for fare increases and 16%-19% for
fare decreases.
The bottom panel of Figure 3 demonstrates that fare increases and decreases are larger
in magnitude and more likely to occur in the last thirty days to departure. Consistent with
the fare hikes observed in Figure 2, the probability of observing a fare increase jumps at
twenty (44%), thirteen (57%), six (72%), and two (61%) days prior to departure. Moreover,
in line with the expectation that demand is more inelastic closer to the date of departure,
the average percentage fare increase, in general, monotonically increases from 26% twenty
days before departure to 67% two days before departure.
Similar to the early booking period, the probability of observing a fare decrease and the
magnitude of the decrease are relatively stable in the last thirty days to departure. During
this late booking period, the probability of a fare decrease hovers around 10% with the
average fare decrease ranging from 17% to 22%.
Overall, the descriptive analysis of dynamic pricing presented in Figures 2 and 3 reveals
two key insights. Foremost, it is important to control for advance-purchase requirements in
our empirical analysis of holiday pricing. Most importantly however, if airlines discount flights
on major holidays, these discounts are likely to differ with the advance-purchase requirement.
For example, if airlines discount flights on federal holidays because price inelastic business
travelers are not purchasing tickets when offices are closed, then holiday purchase discounts
are likely to be larger in magnitude for flights closer to the date of departure (Bilotkach
et al., 2015). In other words, because passengers shopping on a holiday are more likely to be
price elastic, high fares that are typically reserved for late arriving business travelers may be
12
heavily discounted to stimulate purchases from these price elastic customers.
5 Empirical Strategy
To identify holiday booking discounts, we estimate a flight fixed effects model where the
variables of interest are the set of dummies that identify each of the twelve major federal and
shopping holidays that occur during our sample period (see Table 1 for a detailed list). We








+ ρfj + εfjt (1)
where ln(fare)fjt is the natural logarithm of the published fare measured at the flight or
flight-pair (for connecting itineraries) f , directional airport-pair j, and number of days to
departure t ∈ [1, 60], level. DaysToDeparture are a set of dummy variables that indicate
if the fare is collected 1-2, 3-6, 7-13, or 14-20 days before departure. The earliest days
to departure group (21-60 days) serves as the base category, so that the coefficients on the
includedDaysToDeparture dummies indicate the change in fare relative to the early booking
period.20 WeekendBook is a dummy indicating whether the fare is collected on a Saturday or
Sunday. α is the regression intercept while ε is an error term. Standard errors are clustered
at the airport-pair level.
ρfj is a flight-route fixed effect that controls for any time-invariant flight, carrier, and
airport-pair-specific characteristics that may affect fares (i.e., unobservable factors that may
impact the demand elasticity). For example, flight-specific characteristics include the size
and type of aircraft used, the scheduled departure and arrival times, and the date of de-
20These five days to departure categories correspond to the fare increases observed in Figures 2 and 3.
Results are qualitatively similar if we replace the DaysToDeparture dummies with a single variable that
indicates the number of days to departure.
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parture. Carrier-specific characteristics include any fare effects attributable to the airline’s
frequent flyer program, cost structure, and average quality of service. Airport-pair-specific
characteristics include the level of competition on the route, whether low-cost carriers are
present on the route, distance between the origin and destination airports, and the level of
airport dominance at the origin and destination airports.21
Table 1: Holidays during our sample period
Holiday Holiday Type Date Day of Week
Labor Day National September 2, 2019 Monday
Columbus Day Federal/State October 14, 2019 Monday
Veteran’s Day Federal/State November 11, 2019 Monday
Thanksgiving Day National November 28, 2019 Thursday
Black Friday Shopping November 29, 2019 Friday
Cyber Monday Shopping December 2, 2019 Monday
Christmas Eve Shopping December 24, 2019 Tuesday
Christmas Day National December 25, 2019 Wednesday
New Year’s Eve Shopping December 31, 2019 Tuesday
New Year’s Day National January 1, 2020 Wednesday
Martin Luther King Day Federal/State January 20, 2020 Monday
President’s Day Federal/State February 17, 2020 Monday
Notes: National holidays are days most government and private sector employees receive off from work.
Federal/State holidays are days most federal/state government employees receive off from work that private
sector employees may or may not receive. Finally, shopping holidays are dates adjacent to a national holiday
that are typically associated with high volumes of retail sales. These shopping holidays are also dates that
many private and public sector employees decide to take off (i.e., use some of their allotted vacation time).
The variables of interest in equation (1) are the set of HolidayBook dummies that indi-
cate if the fare is published on a holiday. We allow for heterogeneity in fare effects across
holidays by including a separate dummy for each of the twelve federal or shopping holidays
that occur during our sample period. To further explore heterogeneity in holiday booking
discounts, additional specifications examine how these discounts are affected by market struc-
ture, itinerary type (e.g., nonstop vs. connecting flights), the number of days to departure,
21Note that the ρfj fixed effect controls for any fare effects attributable to the route’s market concentration
(typically measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index or a variable counting the number of competitors)





We begin by presenting our baseline holiday booking discount results (Section 6.1). These re-
sults are followed by additional specifications that examine how holiday booking discounts are
affected by advance-purchase requirements, carrier type, the presence of Southwest (Section
6.2), itinerary type (Section 6.3), and market structure (Section 6.4).
6.1 Baseline Holiday Booking Discounts
Table 2 presents regression results from the model described by equation (1). Due to space
constraints and to improve readability, standard errors for the coefficient estimates in Ta-
ble 2 (and Tables 3-5 that follow) are provided in Appendix B. All specifications include
flight-route fixed effects to control for any unobservable time-invariant flight, carrier, and
airport-pair-specific characteristics that affect fares and the demand elasticity. To provide a
baseline for the magnitude of advance-purchase discounts, the first column of Table 2 reports
results when only the DaysToDeparture dummies and flight-route fixed effects are included.
Consistent with Figure 2 and Figure 3, the positive coefficients on the DaysToDeparture
dummies provide clear evidence of advance-purchase discounts (i.e., intertemporal price dis-
crimination). Compared to flights purchased 21-60 days before departure, flights purchased
1-2, 3-6, 7-13, and 14-20 days before departure are 128.2%, 76.8%, 35.5%, and 10.7% more
expensive, respectively.22
The second column of Table 2 adds theWeekendBook andHolidayBook indicators to the
specification presented in column (1). Contrary to the results in Puller and Taylor (2012),
22Because the dependent variable is in natural log form and the DaysToDeparture variables are dummies,
marginal effects are interpreted as the 100(expβ −1)% change in fare. These results are consistent with
Alderighi et al. (2015), Gaggero and Piga (2010), Gillen and Mantin (2009), Luttmann (2019a), and Mantin
and Koo (2009) who find that fares begin to substantially increase three weeks prior to departure.
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but consistent with Mantin and Koo (2010), we find that economy fares published (i.e.,
“purchased” or “booked”) on a weekend (Saturday-Sunday) are not statistically different
from fares published during the workweek (Monday-Friday). The analysis in Puller and
Taylor (2012) relied on detailed transacted fare data from the fourth quarter of 2004, a
timeframe prior to the mergers between US Airways and America West, Delta and Northwest,
United and Continental, Southwest and AirTran, American and US Airways, and Alaska and
Virgin America. While uncertainty exists whether fares in our sample were purchased at the
published rates, our results suggest that the weekend purchase discount may no longer hold
in the newly consolidated U.S. airline industry.
The negative and statistically significant coefficient on HolidayBook in column (2) of
Table 2 indicates that fares published on a federal or shopping holiday are 1.8% cheaper than
fares published on non-holiday dates, supporting the conjecture that airlines price discrimi-
nate when the mix of purchasing passengers makes demand more elastic. To determine if the
holiday discount differs with how far in advance airfare is booked, column (3) presents results
when HolidayBook is interacted with the DaysToDeparture dummies. We find substantial
heterogeneity in the magnitude of the holiday booking discount, ranging from no discount for
flights booked 7-13 days in advance to 12.9% for flights booked 1-2 days in advance. In addi-
tion, flights booked on a holiday with 3-6, 14-20, or 21-60 day advance-purchase requirements
are 6.0%, 1.0%, and 1.3% cheaper, respectively.
It is not surprising to find that the holiday booking discount is largest for flights booked
1-2 or 3-6 days prior to departure. Because passengers shopping on a holiday are more likely
to be price elastic, high fares typically reserved for late arriving business travelers must be
heavily discounted to stimulate purchases from these price elastic customers.
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Table 2: Baseline holiday booking effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DaysToDeparture 1-2 0.825*** 0.825*** 0.834*** 0.825*** 0.825***
DaysToDeparture 3-6 0.570*** 0.570*** 0.574*** 0.570*** 0.570***
DaysToDeparture 7-13 0.304*** 0.304*** 0.303*** 0.304*** 0.304***
DaysToDeparture 14-20 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.102***
WeekendBook 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
HolidayBook -0.018*** -0.013***
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 1-2 -0.125***
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 3-6 -0.049***
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 7-13 0.020***
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 14-20 0.003
Book on Labor Day -0.015*** -0.017***
Book on Columbus Day 0.025*** 0.021***
Book on Veteran’s Day 0.009*** 0.007**
Book on Thanksgiving -0.016*** -0.016***
Book on Black Friday -0.023*** -0.025***
Book on Cyber Monday -0.009*** -0.007***
Book on Christmas Eve -0.061*** -0.058***
Book on Christmas Day -0.061*** -0.059***
Book on New Year’s Eve -0.048*** -0.043***
Book on New Year’s Day -0.041*** -0.036***
Book on M.L. King Day 0.049*** 0.047***
Book on President’s Day 0.009 0.009
LCC × Book on Labor Day 0.008
LCC × Book on Columbus Day 0.018***
LCC × Book on Veteran’s Day 0.012***
LCC × Book on Thanksgiving 0.002
LCC × Book on Black Friday 0.007
LCC × Book on Cyber Monday -0.008
LCC × Book on Christmas Eve -0.016**
LCC × Book on Christmas Day -0.007
LCC × Book on New Year’s Eve -0.026***
LCC × Book on New Year’s Day -0.024***
LCC × Book on M.L. King Day 0.013**
LCC × Book on President’s Day -0.002
R2 0.420 0.420 0.421 0.421 0.421
Observations 21,829,963 21,829,963 21,829,963 21,829,963 21,829,963
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of fare. Marginal effects are interpreted as the 100(expβ −1)%
change in fare. All specifications include flight-route fixed effects that control for any time-invariant flight, carrier, and
airport-pair-specific characteristics that affect fares. Standard errors are clustered at the airport-pair level. Due to
space constraints, the regression constant is not reported and standard errors are provided in Appendix Table B1. ***
Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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To determine if holiday booking discounts differ across holidays, column (4) of Table 2
replaces theHolidayBook indicator with separate indicators for each of the twelve federal and
shopping holidays that occur during our sample period. We find substantial heterogeneity
in holiday discounts ranging from 0.9% for fares booked on Cyber Monday to 5.9% for fares
booked on Christmas Eve or Christmas Day. Although we estimate fare premiums ranging
from 0.9% to 5.0% for flights booked on Martin Luther King Day, President’s Day, Columbus
Day, and Veteran’s Day, not all private sector or state government employers observe these
federal holidays.23 Therefore, it is not surprising to find that holiday booking discounts do
not extend to these four holidays.
The last column of Table 2 presents results when the holiday booking effects are allowed
to vary between FSCs (Alaska, American, Delta, and United) and LCCs (Allegiant, Frontier,
JetBlue, Spirit, and Sun Country). Consistent with column (4), the positive coefficients
on the Martin Luther King, President’s, Columbus, and Veteran’s Day variables indicate
that both carrier types do not discount fares on these four federal holidays. Furthermore,
the statistically insignificant coefficients on the Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, Black Friday,
Cyber Monday, and Christmas Day interaction terms suggests that FSCs and LCCs do not
differ in average discounts offered on these five holidays. Similar to the column (4) results,
published fares are 1.7%, 1.6%, 2.5%, 0.7% and 5.7% cheaper on Labor Day, Thanksgiving
Day, Black Friday, Cyber Monday, and Christmas Day, respectively.
However, the negative and statistically significant coefficients on the Christmas Eve, New
Year’s Eve, and New Year’s Day interactions in column (5) of Table 2 indicate that LCCs
offer larger discounts than FSCs on these three holidays. On Christmas Eve, fares for LCCs
are 7.1% cheaper compared to 5.6% cheaper for FSCs. On New Year’s Eve and New Year’s
day, LCC fares are 6.7% and 5.8% cheaper compared to 4.2% and 3.5% cheaper for FSCs.
23For example, employees of The MITRE Corporation (the current employer for one of the author’s of this
study) currently do not receive President’s Day or Columbus Day off from work. Many state government
employees (e.g., California, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington, among others) do not receive
Columbus Day off. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, full-time private-sector employees receive
an average of 7.6 paid federal holidays (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ebs.t05.htm).
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6.2 Holiday Booking Discounts and Southwest Presence
There may be a concern that the results in Table 2 are biased due to our lack of available
fare data from Southwest.24 To examine this possibility, Table 3 presents results when the
advance-purchase and holiday booking effects are allowed to vary across two types of markets:
markets where Southwest is present (i.e., airport-pairs where Southwest provides nonstop
service) and markets where Southwest is not present (i.e., airport-pairs that Southwest does
not serve nonstop).
Column (1) of Table 3 presents results when the specification in column (1) of Table
2 is augmented to include interactions between the DaysToDeparture dummies and the
Southwest presence indicator.25 The statistically insignificant coefficients on the 7-13 and
14-20 interactions indicates that the presence of Southwest does not affect average fare hikes
for flights purchased 7-20 days before departure. However, the negative and statistically
significant coefficients on the 1-2 and 3-6 interaction terms indicates that the presence of
Southwest dampens average fare premiums for flights within one-week of departure. Com-
pared to flights purchased 21-60 days before departure, flights purchased 1-2 days before
departure are 137.0% more expensive in markets without Southwest compared to 116.4%
more expensive in markets where Southwest is present. Similarly, flights purchased 3-6 days
before departure are 83.7% more expensive in markets without Southwest compared to 67.2%
more expensive in markets where Southwest is present.
Column (2) of Table 3 presents results when WeekendBook, HolidayBook, and the in-
teraction between HolidayBook and Southwest are added to the specification in column
(1). The small and statistically insignificant coefficient on HolidayBook × Southwest indi-
cates that average holiday booking discounts do not differ across markets where Southwest
is present and markets where Southwest is not present. Similar to the results in column (2)
of Table 2, fares published on a federal or shopping holiday are 1.8% cheaper in both types
24For example, competition from Southwest has been shown to have large negative fare effects (Brueckner
et al., 2013; Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008; Morrison, 2001; Kwoka et al., 2016).
25The Southwest presence indicator itself is not separately identified from the flight-route fixed effects.
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of markets.
Table 3: Holiday booking effects and the presence of Southwest
(1) (2) (3)
DaysToDeparture 1-2 0.863*** 0.863*** 0.871***
DaysToDeparture 3-6 0.608*** 0.608*** 0.612***
DaysToDeparture 7-13 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.312***
DaysToDeparture 14-20 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.101***
DaysToDeparture 1-2 × Southwest -0.091** -0.091** -0.090**
DaysToDeparture 3-6 × Southwest -0.094* -0.094* -0.095*
DaysToDeparture 7-13 × Southwest -0.024 -0.024 -0.024
DaysToDeparture 14-20 × Southwest 0.004 0.004 0.004
WeekendBook 0.001 0.001
HolidayBook -0.018*** -0.013***
HolidayBook × Southwest 0.0003 0.001
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 1-2 -0.122***
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 3-6 -0.051***
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 7-13 0.023***
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 14-20 0.001
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 1-2 × Southwest -0.008
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 3-6 × Southwest 0.007
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 7-13 × Southwest -0.007
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 14-20 × Southwest 0.003
R2 0.422 0.422 0.422
Observations 21,829,963 21,829,963 21,829,963
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of fare. Marginal effects are interpreted as the
100(expβ −1)% change in fare. All specifications include flight-route fixed effects that control for any time-
invariant flight, carrier, and airport-pair-specific characteristics that affect fares. Standard errors are clustered
at the airport-pair level. Due to space constraints, the regression constant is not reported and standard errors
are provided in Appendix Table B2. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
In Table 2, holiday booking discounts were found to differ with how far in advance air-
fare is purchased, with the largest discounts reserved for flights within one-week of depar-
ture. To determine if the presence of Southwest affects these holiday booking discounts,
column (3) of Table 3 presents results when the HolidayBook×DaysToDeparture interac-
tion terms are interacted with the Southwest presence indicator. In this specification, the
HolidayBook×Southwest and HolidayBook×DaysToDeparture×Southwest interactions
are all statistically insignificant, providing further evidence that the presence of Southwest
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does not affect average holiday booking discounts.
6.3 Holiday Booking Discounts and Itinerary Type
Our baseline results in Table 2 constrain the advance-purchase and holiday booking effects to
be constant across nonstop and connecting trips. However, because the quality of nonstop and
connecting trips differ, it is possible that the advance-purchase and holiday booking effects
differ between these two types of trips (Luttmann, 2019a). To examine this possibility, Table
4 presents results when the advance-purchase and holiday booking effects are allowed to vary
across nonstop and connecting trips.
Column (1) of Table 4 presents results when the specification in column (1) of Table
2 is augmented to include interactions between the DaysToDeparture dummies and the
connecting trip indicator.26 The statistically insignificant coefficient on the 14-20 interaction
term indicates that trip type does not affect average fare hikes for flights purchased 14-20
days before departure. However, the negative and statistically significant coefficients on
the 1-2, 3-6, and 7-13 interactions indicates that fare hikes for flights purchased within two
weeks of departure are larger for nonstop trips. Compared to flights purchased 21-60 days
before departure, flights purchased 1-2 days before departure are 144.2% more expensive for
nonstop trips and 87.6% more expensive for connecting trips. Similarly, flights purchased 3-6
days before departure are 84.8% more expensive for nonstop trips and 53.7% more expensive
for connecting trips. Finally, flights purchased 7-13 days before departure are 37.6% more
expensive for nonstop trips and 28.0% more expensive for connecting trips.
Column (2) of Table 4 presents results when WeekendBook, HolidayBook, and the inter-
action between HolidayBook and the connecting trip indicator are added to the specification
in column (1). The positive and statistically significant coefficient onHolidayBook×Connect
indicates that holiday booking discounts are larger for nonstop trips. Compared to fares pub-
lished on non-holiday dates, fares published on a federal or shopping holiday are 2.0% cheaper
26The connecting trip indicator itself is not separately identified from the flight-route fixed effects.
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for nonstop trips and 1.6% cheaper for connecting trips.
Table 4: Holiday booking effects and connecting flights
(1) (2) (3)
DaysToDeparture 1-2 0.893*** 0.893*** 0.902***
DaysToDeparture 3-6 0.614*** 0.614*** 0.619***
DaysToDeparture 7-13 0.319*** 0.319*** 0.317***
DaysToDeparture 14-20 0.104*** 0.104*** 0.104***
DaysToDeparture 1-2 × Connect -0.264*** -0.264*** -0.265***
DaysToDeparture 3-6 × Connect -0.184*** -0.184*** -0.187***
DaysToDeparture 7-13 × Connect -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072***
DaysToDeparture 14-20 × Connect -0.015 -0.015 -0.015
WeekendBook 0.001 0.001
HolidayBook -0.020*** -0.013***
HolidayBook × Connect 0.004** 0.001
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 1-2 -0.130***
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 3-6 -0.061***
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 7-13 0.020***
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 14-20 0.002
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 1-2 × Connect 0.015
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 3-6 × Connect 0.034***
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 7-13 × Connect 0.002
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 14-20 × Connect 0.003
R2 0.428 0.428 0.428
Observations 21,829,963 21,829,963 21,829,963
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of fare. Marginal effects are interpreted as the
100(expβ −1)% change in fare. All specifications include flight-route fixed effects that control for any time-
invariant flight, carrier, and airport-pair-specific characteristics that affect fares. Standard errors are clustered
at the airport-pair level. Due to space constraints, the regression constant is not reported and standard errors
are provided in Appendix Table B3. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent
level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
In Table 2, holiday booking discounts differed with how far in advance airfare is pur-
chased, with the largest discounts reserved for flights within one-week of departure. To
determine if these holiday booking discounts differ across nonstop and connecting trips,
column (3) of Table 4 presents results when the HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture inter-
action terms are interacted with the connecting trip indicator. In this specification, the
HolidayBook × Connect and HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture × Connect interactions
attached to the 1-2, 7-13, and 14-20 advance-purchase requirements are all statistically in-
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significant, implying that average holiday booking discounts do not differ across nonstop
and connecting trips for flights purchased 1-2 or 7-60 days before departure. However, the
HolidayBook ×DaysToDeparture 3-6×Connect coefficient is positive and statistically sig-
nificant, indicating that holiday booking discounts are larger for nonstop trips purchased 3-6
days before departure. Compared to flights purchased 21-60 days before departure, flights
purchased 3-6 days before departure are 7.4% cheaper for nonstop trips and 3.9% cheaper
for connecting trips.
6.4 Holiday Booking Discounts and Market Structure
The results in Tables 2, 3, and 4 provide evidence consistent with airlines price discriminating
on several major holidays when the mix of purchasing passengers is expected to be more price
elastic. To determine how holiday booking discounts are affected by the level of competition,
Table 5 presents results when the specification in column (2) of Table 2 is augmented to
include the interaction between HolidayBook and the number of nonstop carriers serving
the route on the observed departure date (NCompetitors).27
Although classical economic theory predicts that the extent of price discrimination should
decrease with competition because incumbent firms find it more difficult to maintain markups
over marginal cost as new competitors enter, the predicted effect in oligopolistic markets is
ambiguous (Borenstein, 1985; Chandra and Lederman, 2018; Holmes, 1989; Stole, 2007). In
column (1) of Table 5, the coefficient on NCompetitors×HolidayBook is small and statis-
tically insignificant, suggesting that the level of competition does not impact the magnitude
of the holiday booking discount. However, NCompetitors × HolidayBook is potentially
endogenous. For example, markets with high fares due to a lack of competition may be
attractive for entry. On the other hand, these markets may be unattractive if high fares
are due to entry barriers such as slot controls or limited access to gates at the endpoint
27The NCompetitors variable itself is not separately identified from the flight-route fixed effects.
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airports (Luttmann and Nehiba, 2020).28 Thus, the potential simultaneity bias that results
from an airline’s decision to enter or exit a given route may be attenuating the coefficient on
NCompetitors×HolidayBook towards zero.
Table 5: Holiday booking effects and market structure
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent variable: ln(fare) NCompetitors × HolidayBook ln(fare)
Estimator: OLS OLS (First-Stage) 2SLS
DaysToDeparture 1-2 0.825*** -0.002*** 0.825***
DaysToDeparture 3-6 0.570*** 0.002*** 0.570***
DaysToDeparture 7-13 0.304*** 0.002*** 0.304***
DaysToDeparture 14-20 0.102*** 0.000 0.102***
WeekendBook 0.001 0.001*** 0.001
HolidayBook -0.017*** 3.040*** 0.021
NCompetitors × HolidayBook -0.0002 -0.013***
LagNCompetitors × HolidayBook 0.193***
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 37.90***
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 56.34***
R2 0.420 0.829 0.420
Observations 21,829,963 21,704,815 21,704,815
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the natural logarithm of fare while the interaction between
NCompetitors and HolidayBook (endogenous variable) is the dependent variable in column (2). Column (3) presents
two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of column (1) using LagNCompetitors×HolidayBook (one-year lagged value)
as an instrument for NCompetitors × HolidayBook. Column (2) presents first-stage estimates for the 2SLS estimates
in column (3). In columns (1) and (3), marginal effects are interpreted as the 100(expβ −1)% change in fare. All
specifications include flight-route fixed effects that control for any time-invariant flight, carrier, and airport-pair-specific
characteristics that affect fares. Standard errors are clustered at the airport-pair level. Due to space constraints, the
regression constant is not reported and standard errors are provided in Appendix Table B4. *** Significant at the 1
percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
To correct for the potential endogeneity of NCompetitors×HolidayBook, we instrument
for the current number of competitors using its one-year lagged value.29 Although unobserved
cost and demand shocks captured in the regression error term may persist over time, they
are less likely to be correlated with previous year number of competitors than with the
28Slot controls are restrictions on the number of flights that are allowed to takeoff and land in a given time
interval. Slot controls are currently implemented to mitigate congestion at Reagan National (DCA) airport
in Washington, DC and LaGuardia (LGA) and John F. Kennedy (JFK) airports in New York City.
29Previous studies that instrument for current market structure using lagged market structure include
Davis (2005), Evans et al. (1993), Greenfield (2014), and Whalen (2007), among others.
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current number of competitors. Since our measure of competition varies at the daily level,
we instrument for NCompetitors×HolidayBook using the interaction between the number
of nonstop carriers serving the route on the same corresponding day during the previous
calendar year and HolidayBook (LagNCompetitors×HolidayBook).30,31
Column (3) of Table 5 presents two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates while (2) presents
the first-stage results. The statistically significant coefficient on LagNCompetitors×HolidayBook
in column (2) and the statistically significant Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic in column
(3) indicates that our instrument is both strong and relevant. After correcting for potential
endogeneity, the coefficient on NCompetitors × HolidayBook in column (3) is now larger
in absolute value and statistically significant, indicating that an increase in competition is
associated with larger holiday purchase discounts. In particular, we find that holiday pur-
chase discounts are not offered on monopoly or duopoly routes but are offered on routes with
three or more competitors (e.g., 1.8% discount on triopoly routes, 3.1% discount on routes
with four competitors, 4.4% discount on routes with five competitors, and 5.7% discount on
routes with six competitors).32
30To construct our instrument, we rely on the Airline Service Quality Performance 234 database provided
by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Because all U.S. carriers that account for at least one percent
of domestic scheduled passenger revenues are required to report on-time performance data for each domestic
flight, these data allow us to compute the number of nonstop carriers providing service on each route in our
analysis sample on a given day.
31In the case when the calendar date of the holiday differs across years, LagNCompetitors is set equal to
the number of nonstop carriers serving the route on the same corresponding holiday during the previous year.
For example, Thanksgiving occurred on November 29th, 2019 during our sample period and on November
22nd, 2018 during the previous calendar year. Accordingly, our instrument for flights departing on November
29th, 2019 is set equal to the number of nonstop carriers serving the route on November 22nd, 2018.
32The estimated holiday purchase effect is 100 × (βHolidayBook + βNCompetitors×HolidayBook ×
NCompetitors × HolidayBook). This expression is 0.8% for monopoly routes (not statistically different
from zero), -0.5% for duopoly routes (not statistically different from zero), -1.8% for triopoly routes, -3.1%




Sales during Thanksgiving, Christmas, and other holiday periods are common in a variety
of retail markets. In this article, we examined whether holiday discounts also occur in
the airline industry. Because business travelers are unlikely to purchase tickets outside of
normal business hours, federal holidays provide airlines with an opportunity to practice third-
degree price discrimination by offering discounts to passengers who purchase on these dates.
Exploiting a unique panel of almost 22 million fares collected over a seven-month period, we
find that fares published on a federal holiday for flights in the sixty-day period following the
holiday are 1.8% cheaper, supporting the conjecture that airlines price discriminate when the
mix of purchasing passengers makes demand more elastic. Further decomposing our results,
we find that the largest holiday discounts are offered for flights that are within one-week of
departure (fares typically purchased by business travelers) and for flights booked during the
Christmas (5.9% cheaper) and New Year’s (4.0%-4.7% cheaper) holidays.
We also offer new evidence on the relationship between market structure and price dis-
crimination. In oligopolistic markets, competition may either increase or decrease the extent
of price discrimination when consumers differ both in their underlying willingness-to-pay and
their degree of brand loyalty (as exists in the U.S. airline industry). We find that an increase
in competition is associated with larger holiday purchase discounts. Notably, these discounts
do not appear to be offered on monopoly or duopoly routes but are offered on routes with
three or more carriers providing nonstop service.
The analysis presented in this article offer some interesting avenues for further research.
Future studies could extend the present analysis to other oligopolistic markets such as the
cruise line, hotel, passenger railway, retail gasoline, and shipping markets. Although the
analysis in this article focused on the U.S. airline industry, similar analyses could also be
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Appendix A: List of markets included in our analysis
Table A1: List of directional airport-pairs included in our analysis
ABQ-LGA DFW-LAS JFK-MIA MKE-SFO RIC-LAX
ATL-BOS DFW-LAX JFK-PBI MSP-LAS SAN-OAK
ATL-FLL DFW-LGA JFK-SFO MSP-MCO SAN-SFO
ATL-LAS DFW-MCO LAS-LAX MSP-PHX SAN-SJC
ATL-LAX DFW-ORD LAX-ATL MSP-RSW SAN-SMF
ATL-LGA DTW-FLL LAX-BOS OAK-BUR SAT-BOS
ATL-MCO DTW-LAS LAX-DEN OAK-LAS SEA-LAS
BDL-PHX DTW-MCO LAX-DFW OAK-LAX SEA-LAX
BDL-SFO DTW-RSW LAX-EWR OAK-SAN SEA-PHX
BOS-ATL EWR-FLL LAX-JAX OAK-SNA SEA-SAN
BOS-DCA EWR-IAH LAX-JFK ORD-BOS SEA-SFO
BOS-FLL EWR-LAX LAX-LAS ORD-DCA SFO-BDL
BOS-LAX EWR-MCO LAX-MCO ORD-DEN SFO-BOS
BOS-MCO EWR-MIA LAX-OAK ORD-DFW SFO-EWR
BOS-MIA EWR-ORD LAX-ORD ORD-FLL SFO-JFK
BOS-ORD EWR-PBI LAX-SEA ORD-LAS SFO-LAS
BOS-RSW EWR-RSW LAX-SFO ORD-LAX SFO-LAX
BOS-SFO EWR-SFO LGA-ATL ORD-LGA SFO-ORD
BUR-OAK FLL-EWR LGA-FLL ORD-MCO SFO-SAN
BWI-FLL FLL-JFK LGA-MCO ORD-MIA SFO-SEA
BWI-LAS FLL-LGA LGA-MIA ORD-PHX SJC-SAN
BWI-MCO HOU-DAL LGA-ORD ORD-SFO SJC-SNA
CLT-LGA IAH-EWR MCO-EWR PDX-FLL SLC-MIA
CMH-SEA IAH-LAS MDW-DEN PDX-LAS SMF-BUR
DAL-HOU JAX-LAX MDW-FLL PDX-LAX SMF-SAN
DAL-LAS JAX-PHX MDW-LAS PHL-FLL SMF-SNA
DEN-LAS JFK-FLL MDW-LAX PHL-MCO SNA-MCO
DEN-LAX JFK-LAS MDW-MCO PHL-SNA SNA-SJC
DEN-MCO JFK-LAX MDW-PHX PHX-DEN
DEN-PHX JFK-MCO MIA-LGA RIC-LAS
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Appendix B: Standard errors for coefficient estimates in
Tables 2-5
Table B1: Standard errors for coefficient estimates in Table 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DaysToDeparture 1-2 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
DaysToDeparture 3-6 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
DaysToDeparture 7-13 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
DaysToDeparture 14-20 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
WeekendBook (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HolidayBook (0.001) (0.001)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 1-2 (0.007)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 3-6 (0.006)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 7-13 (0.004)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 14-20 (0.003)
Book on Labor Day (0.004) (0.004)
Book on Columbus Day (0.003) (0.003)
Book on Veteran’s Day (0.003) (0.003)
Book on Thanksgiving (0.003) (0.003)
Book on Black Friday (0.003) (0.003)
Book on Cyber Monday (0.003) (0.003)
Book on Christmas Eve (0.004) (0.004)
Book on Christmas Day (0.004) (0.004)
Book on New Year’s Eve (0.003) (0.003)
Book on New Year’s Day (0.003) (0.003)
Book on M.L. King Day (0.004) (0.004)
Book on President’s Day (0.007) (0.008)
LCC × Book on Labor Day (0.009)
LCC × Book on Columbus Day (0.005)
LCC × Book on Veteran’s Day (0.004)
LCC × Book on Thanksgiving (0.005)
LCC × Book on Black Friday (0.006)
LCC × Book on Cyber Monday (0.006)
LCC × Book on Christmas Eve (0.006)
LCC × Book on Christmas Day (0.007)
LCC × Book on New Year’s Eve (0.005)
LCC × Book on New Year’s Day (0.005)
LCC × Book on M.L. King Day (0.006)
LCC × Book on President’s Day (0.021)
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Table B2: Standard errors for coefficient estimates in Table 3
(1) (2) (3)
DaysToDeparture 1-2 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
DaysToDeparture 3-6 (0.037) (0.037) (0.038)
DaysToDeparture 7-13 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
DaysToDeparture 14-20 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
DaysToDeparture 1-2 × Southwest (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
DaysToDeparture 3-6 × Southwest (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
DaysToDeparture 7-13 × Southwest (0.037) (0.037) (0.036)
DaysToDeparture 14-20 × Southwest (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
WeekendBook (0.000) (0.000)
HolidayBook (0.001) (0.002)
HolidayBook × Southwest (0.002) (0.002)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 1-2 (0.010)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 3-6 (0.009)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 7-13 (0.005)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 14-20 (0.004)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 1-2 × Southwest (0.015)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 3-6 × Southwest (0.012)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 7-13 × Southwest (0.007)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 14-20 × Southwest (0.005)
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Table B3: Standard errors for coefficient estimates in Table 4
(1) (2) (3)
DaysToDeparture 1-2 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
DaysToDeparture 3-6 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
DaysToDeparture 7-13 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
DaysToDeparture 14-20 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
DaysToDeparture 1-2 × Connect (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
DaysToDeparture 3-6 × Connect (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
DaysToDeparture 7-13 × Connect (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
DaysToDeparture 14-20 × Connect (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
WeekendBook (0.000) (0.000)
HolidayBook (0.001) (0.001)
HolidayBook × Connect (0.002) (0.003)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 1-2 (0.009)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 3-6 (0.008)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 7-13 (0.005)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 14-20 (0.003)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 1-2 × Connect (0.013)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 3-6 × Connect (0.010)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 7-13 × Connect (0.006)
HolidayBook × DaysToDeparture 14-20 × Connect (0.004)
Table B4: Standard errors for coefficient estimates in Table 5
(1) (2) (3)
DaysToDeparture 1-2 (0.022) (0.001) (0.022)
DaysToDeparture 3-6 (0.026) (0.001) (0.026)
DaysToDeparture 7-13 (0.019) (0.000) (0.019)
DaysToDeparture 14-20 (0.007) (0.000) (0.007)
WeekendBook (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HolidayBook (0.003) (0.127) (0.013)
NCompetitors × HolidayBook (0.001) (0.004)
LagNCompetitors × HolidayBook (0.026)
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